PUTTING COMMUNITY EQUITY IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT:
RESIDENT EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
By Barbara Bezdek1
Property is more accurately described as being inextricably part of a network of
relationships that is neither limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries
with which the legal system is accustomed to dealing.2
Property is inextricably bound up in a network of economic and social relationships.
Regulating the negative externalities of land use that traverse legal boundaries and impose social
costs on neighbors lies at the heart of much of our land use law.3 Cities are comprised of
neighborhoods, within which communities sharing a geographic space over time, establish that
―small-scale, everyday public life‖ and learn to manage themselves through working
relationships and voluntary association. Jane Jacobs called this the ―irreplaceable social capital‖
that gave cities their life, as she railed against modern urban planning for destroying that
cooperative condition and thus the trust and social control necessary to viable neighborhoods
within big cities.4
The loss of communities is the predictable result of local government policies to deploy
land use powers and sink public subsidy into for-profit redevelopments that disperse low-wealth
residents, re-title the land, and reallocate urban blocks to remake inner city neighborhoods. In
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effect these redevelopment practices specially tax existing communities in the path of
development, sweeping aside their tangible and intangible capital and connections, while they
cater generously to wealthier in-movers. The special concern of this paper is to recalibrate the
benefits of private-public partnerships to remake inner city neighborhoods, by braking the rate at
which urban land is being reclaimed from low-wealth residents by local governments, whether as
blight clearance or for economic revitalization post-Kelo.5 Public oversight requirements have
not kept pace with the dispossession, yet the costs that these development decisions impose on
the social fabric of communities rend the shared networks necessary to residents‘ abilities to
meet basic social needs, like raising children or earning a living.6 Jacobs warned that once the
web of this ―social capital‖ is destroyed, accumulating new social capital in the re-made place is
a slow and chancy proposition.7
Today many critics seek to limit the authority of government to use eminent domain for
urban redevelopment, to shrink the opportunity for monied interests to leverage government
power for their own projects. Alternatively, others argue for improving the procedures required
before the exercise of eminent domain, or for changing the meaning of ―just compensation.‖8
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This essay explores the creation of community equity shareholding in public/private
redevelopment projects.

Community Equity Shares (CES) embody three principles.

First

Community equity shareholding recognizes limited rights in an existing community, akin to land
ownership, as the basis for both participation in the decision-making about the character of the
redevelopment, and profit participation in the redevelopment projects that displace long-term
residents.9

Second, by instantiating social and geographic community as ownership in the

calculus of land-use, it is possible for residents in the district of a proposed redevelopment to
parlay those shares for two purposes: for participation in the decision-making about proposed
redevelopment, and for participation in the profits from the displacing redevelopment project. A
third principle is to add a player, the special-purpose Community Equity Corporation comprised
of all the community equity shareholders and wielding their limited powers in common, to the
redevelopment deal-making that, unchecked, would impose undue burdens including
displacement upon the long-term residents of the targeted district.

Community Equity

Shareholding can be effectuated by changes in local governments‘ redevelopment and
procurement procedures, which can assist to change the governmental calculus when it uses or
threatens to use its land use powers to displace low-income communities as it re-engineers urban
environs in concert with private developers.
I.

STATUS QUO DEVELOPMENT BY DEAL-MAKING

The principal legal form for remaking city neighborhoods is the public/private
partnership (―PPP‖) by which local government agencies trade essential infrastructure at low or
no cost in exchange for a profit-sharing stake or other anticipated return on the city‘s
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investment.10 Cities have been deal making in this way since the 1970s,11 yet the scale, pace,
complexity and bilateral character of today‘s municipal reliance upon PPPs12 evades the ability
of the locality‘s people to assure that their government is acting for the general welfare, rather
than for select other segments of the populace. A more particular application of this principle
can be stated in the context of intensive redevelopment of deteriorated neighborhoods: local
government should not callously jettison urban residents and scatter them for the gain of private
developers and wealthier in-movers, without enabling the resident community members also to
gain from the renewal of their neighborhood. In a well-functioning democracy, government‘s
role is to responsibly assess the social welfare costs and benefits of its powers, without
illegitimate favoritism or unjustifiable disparate impacts. Particularly in land use law, the central
problem is to regulate the imposition of social costs onto others arising from a specific use of
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land.

The law governing urban redevelopment is overdue for a corrective that will force the

internalization of its true social costs.
The private contract model of development agreements and public/private partnerships
renders invisible the inequitable allocation of the benefits and burdens of the deals that
redistribute urban territories. The disfavored occupants of areas targeted for redevelopment
garner no demonstrable share in the supposed gain to the general welfare which is the doctrinal
justification for the city‘s exercise of governmental powers to condemn and re-title the residents‘
neighborhoods.

In reality of course, courts referee very few of these clashes between the

interests of low-income residents for affordable housing and the social capital accrued in their
neighborhood, and the interests of higher-earning and spending denizens that cities aim to attract
to the newly developed urban territories. Low-wealth communities are replaced by new upscale
housing and shops and a brighter urban image.

The displaced bear burdens which their

compatriots do not: the destruction of their long-time neighborhoods and the social capital they
have built up there. All gone in a Diaspora: the old neighborhood destroyed.13
Local governments participating in the urban real estate market in this way are often
frank about their purpose to engineer new urban territories and repopulate them with the
wealthier classes.14 In the U.S. this urban social engineering is sometimes characterized as a
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modern version of the pioneering that peopled the American plains with striving Europeans.15
The public policy to restructure the territories of the central city unfairly allocates the costs of
revitalization to the current residents and distributes the benefits to others. Increasingly, it is the
developer, not the government, who initiates the redevelopment project and dictates the deal.16
This is the antithesis of governance for the general welfare. This is not new, but its familiarity
should engender sharper scrutiny, and new thinking to correct for its inequities.

II.

TAKING THE COMMUNITY, INFLICTING “NEW POVERTY”

Targeted redevelopment projects in central city neighborhoods cause more harm to lowwealth urban neighborhoods than the physical insertion of unaffordable amenities and the
physical displacement of longstanding residents and businesses.

Investigations into
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spaces and social resources, increased health risks, social disarticulation, the disruption of formal
educational activities, and impairments of civil rights in voting and fair housing rights. Failure to
recognize and avoid these risks may generate ―new poverty,‖ as opposed to the ―old poverty‖
that people suffered before displacement.17
A. Exclusionary Displacement
Compulsory displacements that occur for development reasons raise major questions of
social justice because they inequitably distribute the losses and benefits of the redevelopment. In
the paradigmatic context for the exercise of eminent domain power for true public uses, forced
displacement results from the need to build infrastructure -- highways, hospitals, schools, and
airports. Such programs improve many people‘s lives, deliver indisputably important services,
and proffer employment. Nonetheless, the interests of residents facing displacement differ in
kind and quality from the general public‘s – possessory and economic – many of which do not
figure in the official costs of land assembly despite their complete extinguishment. While local
governments claim to advance the general welfare as they funnel public resources into the
redesign of urban spaces, it is hard to avoid the unvarnished truth that municipalities are
terminating the residency of some in order to construct shiny, new, private residences and shops
for affluent in-movers. This presents us with ineluctable issues of social justice and equity.
Outside the condemnation regime, it is low-income tenants who bear the greatest burden as cities
court an increased tax base through gentrification.
B. Displacement by Destruction of Affordable Housing
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Cities‘ public/private redevelopment projects continue to use eminent domain powers to
displace low-income households and raze their homes, but not to build more affordable
housing.18 This effect was achieved on a grand scale in the Urban Renewal Era of the 1950s1970s,19 and in the successive forms of redevelopment since then20 as local governments have
actively courted gentrification in inter-jurisdictional competitions for tax base.
Animating the legislative responsiveness to condo conversion was the powerful appeal of
the security of ‗home.‘ The specter of being forced from one‘s home is one of the paradigms of
autocratic government (as well as ruthless creditors). Protection against such uprooting by
government inheres in our concept of liberty, and has always been protected to some degree by
our Constitution, for example in the Fourth Amendment as well as in the Takings Clause.
The contemporary crisis in housing affordability, which plagues millions of Americans
caught in the crosshairs of disappearing low-cost housing, rising rents, and flat wages, raises the
further fear among tenants of repeated relocation.

Involuntary relocation discourages displaced

persons from the exercise of a key organizational interest necessary in a democratic state. 21
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Even before the current foreclosure crisis, which has caused a substantial number of renters as
well as homeowners to lose their homes, the number of households experiencing housing
problems was increasing. From 2000 to 2006, the number of low-income renter households
whose housing costs exceed 50 percent of their income (a group the Department of Housing and
Urban Development categorizes as having ―severe housing cost burdens‖) increased by 2
million, or 34 percent. More than 12 million low-income households receive no federal housing
assistance and face housing problems that public housing (or other housing assistance) would
alleviate, if there were a sufficient stock of assisted housing.22
Studies of urban renewal reveal that the typical residents displaced by urban renewal paid
20% more rent after being relocated;23 from one-fourth to one-half of displaced families lived in
substandard housing despite a substantial rent increase.24 In 1970 Congress enacted the Uniform
Relocation Act (URA) to compel federal agencies, as well as state and local agencies receiving
federal funds, to provide relocation assistance to ―displaced persons,‖ including payments to
secure ―comparable replacement housing.‖ The most extensive study conducted since the URA
was enacted is U.S. Department of Transportation Relocation Retrospective Study in 1995.
Nearly 90% of the homeowners surveyed indicated that they were ―able to significantly upgrade‖
22

BARBARA SARD & WILL FISCHER, PRESERVING SAFE, HIGH QUALITY PUBLIC HOUSING SHOULD BE A PRIORITY OF
FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY 5 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities September 18, 2008). The nation retains 1.2
million public housing units, in 14,000 projects spread throughout 3,500 communities. These house 2.3 million
Americans who are among the poorest and most vulnerable, due chiefly to age and disability. Two-thirds of the
households include an elderly person; and 41% include children. Id. at 3. Most public housing residents are
extremely poor; the typical (or median) household in public housing had annual income of just $8,788 in 2006. Id.
at 4. Seventy-three percent of the households living in public housing have incomes of 30 percent or less of the area
median income for their household size. Id. at 5.
A family must be ―low-income‖ — meaning that its income may not exceed 80 percent of the local median income
— in order to move into public housing. At least 40 percent of the new families an agency admits each year must be
―extremely low income,‖ with incomes at or below 30 percent of the local median. Generally, agencies exceed this
40 percent requirement by a wide margin. Most tenants are required to pay 30 percent of their income (after certain
deductions are taken out) for rent and utilities. Id.
23
BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 34-35 (The MIT
Press 1997).
24
Chester W. Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REV. 745, 781-817 (1971).

their housing, but that

over 50% of those surveyed were no longer living in their replacement

housing a year after receiving the payment.25 As reported recently by the United States General
Accounting Office,
When private property is taken by eminent domain, hardship often
follows. Neighborhoods may be disassembled, businesses may be forced
to close. At an absolute minimum, individuals and businesses may be
uprooted against their will. The ―just compensation‖ mandated by the
Fifth Amendment often does not and cannot provide adequate redress. For
example, a tenant renting a house or apartment from month to month
would most likely get nothing except an eviction notice.26

C. Gentrification for Some
Disputes about whether gentrification causes displacement, and if so, whether that is a
good thing for the poor among the public, have been at the heart of heated analytic and political
debates over urban change for the last forty years.27 There can be no serious disagreement that
the U.S. has seen 20 years of intense gentrification and sweeping public policy changes that
impact the shape of our cities. These operate in contemporary housing market dynamics at the
national, regional and city levels, and can be expected to create a variety of displacement
pressures, intersecting in locally contingent ways on neighborhoods occupying desired
redevelopment locales.
Residents may be displaced directly as a result of housing demolition, owners‘
conversion of rental units to condominiums, increased housing costs in the form of rent or taxes,
25
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landlord pressure, and eviction. Residents who manage to avoid these direct displacement
pressures may nonetheless be displaced by rising housing expenses associated with
gentrification.

As affordable housing becomes scarce in gentrifying areas, neighborhoods

become too pricey, requiring lower-income residents to search elsewhere for housing.28
Where earlier research accepted displacement as a part of the gentrification process, some
recent studies raised doubt, finding that disadvantaged renters in New York City were somewhat
less likely to move out of gentrifying neighborhoods than out of non-gentrified neighborhoods.29
Even so, this evidence, while new and useful, fails to reach far enough, for example to address
the effects in conditions of rapidly gentrifying hot neighborhoods accelerate rent hikes that
prices out even those lower–income residents who managed to remain during initial economic
transition.30
The restructuring of urban space as cities experience economic and policy change
impacts the ability of low-income residents to stay put. This narrow new evidence suggesting
displacement may not always be dramatic, can be overused to dismiss concerns about the
exclusionary effect of contemporary market-oriented urban strategies, featuring homeownership, mixed-income and social-dispersal strategies, and affluent-attractant downtown
destinations, which have been widely embraced as curatives for the disinvested inner city.31
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D. Taking Social Capital
Invasive redevelopment projects destroy vital social and cultural ties crucial to residents‘
ability to meet their basic social and economic needs.32

Displacement specialists working in

international development call this ―the resettlement effect,‖ defined as the loss of physical and
non-physical assets, including homes, communities, land, income-earning assets and sources,
cultural sites, social structures, networks and ties, cultural identity and mutual help
mechanisms.33

In the U.S., numerous studies document the significant economic and social

welfare gains enjoyed by communities with strong social networks.34 William Julius Wilson has
described the social organization needed to realize and maintain common neighborhood goals,
and has argued that communities unable to sustain the social networks that enable collective
action, are made vulnerable to a range of urban problems, preventing the types of collaboration
essential to community-building.35
Scholarly investigations of social capital feature its collective dimensions, and identify the
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forms of social capital within viable communities.36 Social capital is what persons draw on when
they enlist the aid of others to solve problems, seize opportunities, or accomplish objectives – or
seek just to cope.37 Social capital is formed by informal networks of people (family, friends,
neighbors) who can collaborate to address shared problems and gain access to city political
power.38 One form, coping capital, is especially important for people who are chronically poor
because it takes the place of services that money otherwise would buy.39 Two other forms
include social support – which may come in myriad forms such as help with a flat tire, a ride, a
small loan – and social leverage that helps one get ahead or improve one‘s opportunities, as
through access to job information or scholarship recommendation.40
The legal framework offered by property law recognizes numerous rights of persons
residing in the path of municipality-assisted redevelopment, which currently are destroyed,
without acknowledgement or compensation, in the exercise of urban redevelopment powers.41
Important community interests of persons and communities are similarly destroyed. Lee Ann
Fennell has argued recently that spatial association should be treated as a distinct property
entitlement, at least where patterns of exclusion combine to produce persistent spatial
concentrations of poverty in urban areas, because of its character as a common resource that is
vulnerable to problems of collective action.42
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Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2006).

Neighborhood is a necessity for urban living.43 Urban renewal and gentrification, which
clear out the old residents of stable yet poor neighborhoods, deprive poor residents of a vital
support structure.44
In its physical aspect, a community provides benefits to persons that they otherwise could
not enjoy alone: amenities such as schools, stores, transit, and other public goods or privately
provided services are only available because of the sufficient demand in the area.45 Social
interactions are another set of important benefits—friendships and interpersonal networks of all
kinds that are possible because of physical proximity and common experiences of place and
connection that endure over time.46 Particularly for people living at the lowest levels of income
and materiale, the concern and support of neighbors is critical to physical survival, as well as to
psychic well-being. ―When this milieu is destroyed and its members scattered, it is irretrievably
lost.‖47
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See Peter L. Berger & Richard John Neuhaus, Neighborhood, in TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL
SOCIETY 165, 165-76 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996); see also e.g., Jack L. Nasar & David A. Julian, The
Psychological Sense of Community in the Neighborhood, 61 J. AM. PLAN . ASSN 178, 181 (1995); see also David M.
Chavis & Abraham Wandersman, Sense of Community in the Urban Environment: A Catalysts for Participation and
Community Development, 14 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 55, 55-61 (1990); Thomas J. Glynn, Neighborhood and
a Sense of Community , 14 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 341, 349, 351 (1986) (discussing the values of length of
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(1996).
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Id. at 114; see also Edward Glaeser, The Future of Urban Research: Nonmarket Interactions, 1 BROOKINGSWHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 101, 101-04 (2000), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/ demo/brookingswhartonpapersonurbanaffairs/v2000/2000.1glaeser.pdf.
47.―The poor must often depend on a web of mutual support . . . with each individual contributing to the others
whatever . . . special talents he might have. [Such] exchanges . . . reinforce [each other], creating a milieu the value
of which far exceeds what the physical reality might suggest.‖ Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban
Redevelopment and the Loss of Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685, 702 (1992).. Personal recollections of such webs
of mutual support are related by Dr. Fullilove in ROOT SHOCK, supra note 6.

III.

COMMUNITY-INCLUSIVE CAPITAL FORMATION

Community equity shareholding recognizes the meaningful claims of residents who will
be displaced by changes in urban land use patterns, by allocating to each adult an equity stake in
the wealth generated by such city-supported urban redevelopment. Absent a meaningful role for
residents, local government in effect conveys their existing social place and relationships, at
discount, in order to re-engineer urban environs for the mutual gain of private developers and the
city. Community shareholding brokers the long-experience of community residence as a basis
for participation in the decision-making about redevelopment, and profit participation as a form
of material benefit from redevelopment projects that displace long-term residents.48
Conceptually, the collective action of those slated to be displaced by revitalization
projects is a means to change the governmental calculus when it uses (or threatens to use) its
land use powers to displace low-income communities.49 One form for such collective action is
community legal control of the land use and redevelopment decisions accorded by the City of
Boston to the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative – a model which is much admired but never
replicated. Jim Kelly has recently proposed the creation of a federal right to ―renew and remain‖
through amendment of the Uniform Relocation Act of 1970.50 This essay proposes another tack,
the creation of community equity shareholding in public/private redevelopment projects.
Community members ought not lose their substantial investments in their place, nor have
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Bezdek, Local-Resident Equity Participation, supra note 9.

This practice and the recurring outcomes motif might well be altered by raising the cost to local officials of
trading away low-income housing located in neighborhoods or localities eyed for redevelopment. Low-income
residents would benefit from policies that would provide meaningful incentive to create substitute low-income
housing in the same neighborhood, and configure new development so as to leave such housing in place.
50
James J. Kelly, Jr. Taming Eminent Domain, SHELTERFORCE, March 22, 2008, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271223. The Uniform Relocation and Real Estate Acquisition Policies Act (URA)
requires the governmental agency involved in any project using federal funds to provide relocation benefits to
homeowners, tenants, businesses and nonprofits who are ―displaced persons‖ as defined in the Act.

their residency terminated by local government land use practices that transfer public resources
into largely private redevelopment of residences for others, unless and until residents have
approved the redevelopment.

Such approval might be accompanied by an agreement to

exchange their community residency interests for an equity stake in the benefits generated by the
new development. Such an equity stake could take the form of an alienable right to comparable
replacement housing in the new development, or to shares in the increased economic value
justifying the public participation in the project and generated by it over time, or both.
This set of property interests can be recognized through reforms of the redevelopment
planning requirements of state enabling statutes, to create Community Equity Shares held by
residents of the properties whose area is targeted for redevelopment. The result is a process that
invests residents with rights to consent to development beforehand, and to a share in the benefits
of the deal in which the locality partnered.51
A. Building Wealth: Models of Inclusive Capital Analysis
Poor people and racial minorities have for generations gotten the disproportionate share
of the burdens of land expropriation for urban redevelopment; and eminent domain doctrine is
insufficient to reach their reality. ―Property‖ forms a crucial nexus between the struggle for
well-being, and the capacity to accumulate some predicate quantity of the material aspects that
aid persons to be well, secure, and autonomous.
1. Assets & Opportunities for Enhanced Well-being

51See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2003) (arguing for an objective theory of well-being for legal theory and developing an
objective approach to property law). Applying a new economic ‗happiness‘ literature in the context of corporate
governance, James McConvill has proposed that shareholder participation should be seen as an end in itself, rather
than simply a means to a corporate-oriented end. James McConvill, Shareholder Empowerment as an End in Itself:
a New Perspective on Allocation of Power in the Modern Corporation, VOL. 33 OHIO NORTHERN U. L. REV.
1013, 1015 (2007). Cf. Harry G. Hutchison and R. Sean Alley, The High Costs of Shareholder Participation,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112885.

The critical assets of poor households in our cities tend to be largely undocumented, and
not readily parlayed into formal recognition in the legal processes that structure land transfer and
land use decision-making.52 When Hernando de Soto, seeking to document the asset
accumulation capacity of deeply impoverished people in developing nations, estimated their
undocumented property holdings to exceed $9 trillion, he also argued that the absence of legal
recognition of their property presented a near-complete impediment to turning their assets into
useful capital.53
Significant movement toward this recognition is perhaps underway.

Anti-poverty

advocates and policymakers have embraced asset-building strategies, prompted by the influential
work of Michael Sherraden and colleagues who since 1991 have argued that modern welfare
policy fails in its singular emphasis on income rather than a recognition of assets as a measure of
economic well-being.54 Assets, argues Sherraden, properly understood, encompass less tangible
resources including human capital, cultural capital, political capital and social capital,55 as well
as tangible money savings, real property, stocks and bonds. 56 The meaningful assets in the lives
of many working yet poor urban residents in the U.S. consist of items far removed from our
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Id. at 101-105.
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Kathryn Edin recounts the decision by one woman who resigned her job as a nurse‘s aid just months shy of
earning her certificate, in order to work in retail at [a big box store] where she would have the opportunity, after 3
years, to vest in a pension. Kathryn Edin, More Than Money: The Role of Assests in the Survival Strategies &
Material Well Being of t he Poor, supra n. 54, at 206.

ordinary understandings of real property, or of ―place,‖ or of capital, but pivotal nonetheless in
individuals‘ capacity to function -- a car, a ladder, one‘s uniform.57
This is an important shift in attention to the wealth-building opportunities for low-income
urban dwellers. For most of U.S. history, land was the ultimate asset and primary root of wealth.
It was durable financially as well as physically, in the sense that land retained its value, it was
legally secured by ―property rules‖ and by due process, and it could generate wealth. Land in the
Homesteading Acts era58 was the most highly generative asset: the source of political power in
the early republic, and of self-sufficiency for households and economic development for
communities.59 But in today‘s economy, corporate capital has eclipsed land as the asset that
confers autonomy, given its characteristics as highly generative,60 highly liquid and thus more
disposable than real estate. Arguably it is even more legally secure than land, because business
capital is not generally subject to comparable restrictions on alienability or specific use, or to
eminent domain.

Imagine that instead of the fiscal illusion of public benefit from the proliferation of
public/private redevelopments that deplete the jurisdiction‘s affordable housing stock, it were
possible to make those who bear the burdens of dislocation, direct beneficiaries of the new
project.61 Imagine that local law directs or incentives the PPP to offer Equity Shares in the
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94-579, 90 Stat. 2787 (1976).
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Such a project could sensibly entail requirements for the production of affordable housing elsewhere: a trade of
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value-adding redevelopment to all the residents in the project impact area. This approach would
provide much-needed modernization to the public comment practices of land use planning, and
offer direct benefits to the affected city residents. Community Equity Shareholding as I describe
it here would allow public/private redevelopment of urban community space to be bargained for
and approved by the affected city residents, so that the community may benefit as a whole, and
the members of the displaced population receive meaningful equity shares in the value added
redevelopment. This approach would modernize resident participation strategies in urban land
use planning and regulation extant now for nearly sixty years, by recognizing with market value
the legitimate interests of residents in the space they co-inhabit.
2. Bargaining for Beneficiary Status: Community Benefit Agreements
Existing law has partially recognized aspects of these interests and the ineffective remedies
offered for prospective displacees in the path of urban redevelopment.
Recognition of community interests in land use decisions comes chiefly in the form of nominal
public participation rights by residents in the path of prospective redevelopment projects.62
Public notice and hearing processes, or consultation via charette, offer a veneer of inclusive
deliberation yet exclude residents as stakeholders in the decision about community destruction.63
These processes offer no avenue to shift the burden allocation.64 Public hearings occur too late

62 See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering
Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, Installment Two, 24 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005); Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of
Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV 861, 868-91 (2001) (reviewing resident
participation requirements under various government programs for urban redevelopment from 1949 to the present).
63 Id. An array of successful resident-controlled redevelopment is discussed in, e.g., HEATHER MCCULLOCH WITH
LISA ROBINSON, SHARING THE WEALTH: RESIDENT OWNERSHIP MECHANISMS, A POLICYLINK REPORT (2001),
available at http://www.policylink.org/pdfs/ROMS.pdf; Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined:
Revitalizing the City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 689, 753-58, 767 (discussing the Dudley
Street Neighborhood Initiative in Boston and other examples of resident controlled redevelopment).
64
Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal and its Aftermath, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 443, 446 (2000) (relating the
evisceration of: an Italian enclave in Boston's West End, a Croatian-American community in the Vaughan Street
area in Portland, Oregon; displacement of the residents of Philadelphia's Eastwick project, the inhabitants of New

and address too little for the incorporation of the community‘s interests into the project.
In recent years, Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) have garnered significant
interest among communities and their advocates, precisely because they redress this procedural
insufficiency, and produce community-inclusive modifications to proposed redevelopment
projects. Typically a community benefit agreement is a private contract negotiated between a
prospective developer and representatives of affected communities.65 Several agreements have
been reached whose terms and process show promise for this as one strategy to ameliorate many
of the inequitable results of public/private redevelopments. Under a CBA, community parties
gain promises modifying original development concepts, including affordable housing,
employment participation, open space or other amenities, monitoring provisions, and potential
remedies for breach.

Practically speaking it is a device limited in availability to those

communities already served by established organizations that can muster resources and make
their way to the bargaining table, either before local officials and private developers have made
the deal, or in sufficiently muscular coalition to effect modifications. In practice, a CBA may
have particular utility in relation to very large projects affecting multiple neighborhoods, faith

York's West Village, the Mexican American residents of Los Angeles' Bunker Hill, and the inhabitants of San
Francisco's Western Addition). Id. at 446-49. The Atlantic Yards project began after its targeted site had begun to
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Plan,
September
26,
2006,,http://www.dddb.net/documents/environmental/DEIS/testimony/DDDBBlightResponse.pdf, at 3.. Tenants
have gotten ―the hardest hit,‖ losing rent-stabilized apartments with no guarantee of relocation assistance and no real
option but to leave their community. Deborah Kolben, Nets Site Renters Left Out in Eminent Domain Payouts, THE
BROOKLYN PAPER, Feb. 3, 2006; see also Deborah Kolben, Market for Sellers, Not Renters, THE BROOKLYN PAPER,
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JULIAN GROSS WITH GREG LEROY & MADELINE JANIS-APARICIO, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 9-10 (Good Jobs First & the California Partnership for Working Families
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groups and unions; and conversely, require significant delegation by residents to community
agents to navigate the coalition, negotiate and monitor the CBA. More worrisome, a few case
studies of CBAs caution that some of those organizations that can muster themselves to the table
may be insufficiently representative of the community facing displacement.66
CBAs suffer from two significant drawbacks then.
enforceability as contract.

The first is uncertainty as to

Commentators have raised questions whether the community

members have standing to enforce the terms in the event of breach. Doctrinally and factually the
issue is one of actual consideration. If the community signatories assent, courts may treat CBAs
as a bilateral agreement with beneficial promises to third parties.

The CBA does not alter the

legal structure of the public/private arrangement; it remains fundamentally contractual. It seeks
to involve additional community parties who otherwise would be excluded from crafting the
character and benefit of the proposed development, thus the bilateral negotiation becomes multilateral.
A second difficulty is that the CBA‘s hallmark – its community- representativeness – may
modify the political bargaining essence of the public/private partnership by degree, but not in
kind. This raises a political economy caution, because Community Benefits Agreements do not
necessarily assure an inclusive or transparent process for neighborhood residents. Several recent
CBAs have come under stinging criticism for insufficiently inclusive representation.

For

example, the Bronx Terminal Market CBA, negotiated in 2006, involved no grassroots
community organizations.67

66

Instead, eighteen community groups were handpicked by the

Patricia Salkin, Amy Lavine, Negotiating for Social Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements:
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borough president, and then were given just 30 days to draft an agreement. They received no
technical assistance in a process that, in cities around the U.S., would include enforceable
developer commitments to incorporate affordable housing, local and minority hiring, job
training, and living wage provisions, and often, community facilities such as day care centers and
parks.68

In the Bronx, however, the organizations did not see the completed CBA until the

morning of the city council‘s vote to approve the development plans. At that point, seven of the
organizations refused to sign,69 but the plan was approved nonetheless. The Yankee Stadium
CBA lacked any pretense of being negotiated or signed by any community groups. Instead, it
expressed the agreement between the Yankees, the Bronx borough president and the Bronx
delegation of the New York City Council.70 Critics worry about the true representativeness of
groups who step forward to participate.71
To achieve equitable resident benefit from redevelopment, communities need a device
that will transform association and democratic participation into ownership-spreading through
equity participations. Real resident benefit from urban redevelopment requires three things: (1)
recognition of the significant investments of the residents of poor communities which stake them
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in their collectively inhabited neighborhood space;72 (2) expression of residents‘ stakes in the
form of a correlative claim on the public resources committed to the redevelopment; and (3) a
pragmatic means for crediting residents‘ claims within the relevant time frames of decision and
benefit as to the land use planning, public funding and decision-making of the redevelopment
project. Shares in joint economic undertakings can fit this bill.
B. Community Based Joint Ventures
1. Joint Ventures in Ownership
If corporate capital vehicles are useful for upper income folks to build assets, then surely
that can be true for low-wealth communities as well. Community enterprises that engage poor
people as stakeholders can formulate cooperative relationships in ways that extend the socialcapital of the collective undertaking.

Chronically poor people in the United States living in

starkly segregated enclaves are not likely to know people with the kind of social leverage that
can help them gain freedom from poverty. The sister who provides grey-market child care may
permit one to attend school, but not to assist in gaining admission to a school on a higher rung in
the opportunity structure. That kind of leverage may not be within the kin and friendship
networks of the poorest urban communities. In the United States, a chronically poor person‘s
chances of securing such leverage from social capital are greater where one‘s community
includes some people not like him or her.73
Community development corporations (CDCs) have been an important engine of
community-based self-help for 30 years.74 CDCs have been criticized as no longer accountable
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to the communities where they engage in revitalization, dependent on a mix of public and
foundation contracts, grants and loans and consequently more responsive to funders‘ views than
to their purported community base.75

Despite occasional critiques, numerous CDCs have

managed to scrap their way further into market-based practices in service of their community
stakeholders. Some CDCs are contemplating issuing shares – to enable their stakeholders to be
shareholders.
One particularly important path is the creation of enterprises formed with equity interests.
Examples include the New Community CDC of Newark, New Jersey, which developed a
supermarket;76 the Kansas City CDC that owns a cement block factory; child care centers, health
care facilities.77 Preliminary results from the Market Creek Plaza ―People‘s IPO‖ demonstrate
the capacity of community enterprises to engage poor people as shareholders in successful
enterprises.

2. The People’s IPO: Market Creek Plaza
The most robust model thus far for community equity shareholding is illustrated by
Market Creek Plaza, an enterprise to revitalize a 20 acre industrial site in southeastern San
Diego. The Market Creek Plaza enterprise was formed by a nonprofit organization and designed
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for the express purpose of engaging residents of the low-wealth Diamond Neighborhoods in the
process and benefits of the project.78 In July 2006, Market Creek Partners offered 50,000 shares
to local community residents at $10 a share, with a minimum investment of $200. At the time of
the offering, Diamond Neighborhood residents had a median income of $32,800, and nearly onethird of the households earned less than $20,000 each year.79 Market Creek is now a thriving,
$45 million commercial enterprise, making distributions to its investors. Its anchor tenant is a
full service supermarket – the first major grocer to locate in the area in thirty years.80 The
revitalization now includes a library and performing arts center, an elementary science center, a
state-of-the-art high school, ethnic restaurants, and a conference center. In the next phase, more
than 800 affordable housing units will be built on the site.81
Purchasers become Diamond Community Investors and members of Market Creek
Partners, LLC. As members, each purchaser is entitled to cast one vote, regardless of the number
of units purchased, in the election of the company‘s advisory board.82 The minimum offering
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amount was $250,000, and the maximum offering amount was $500,000. 83 These terms enabled
local residents to own up to a 20% interest in the venture, while the Jacobs Center for
Neighborhood Innovation (JCNI) retained a 60% interest, and the Neighborhood Unity
Foundation (NUF), retained the remaining 20% interest.84 The project is intended to transfer
complete ownership to local residents within 12 years.
Shareholder Qualification. Market Creek Partners established strict eligibility criteria for
all purchasers.85

Most importantly, each purchaser was required to be a resident of the

revitalization district as well as a state resident.86 The purchaser had either to reside currently or
previously to have resided in one of eight designated ―Diamond Neighborhoods.‖

87

Shares‘

initial purchase and resale were limited to ―Diamond Neighborhood Stakeholders‖ as defined by
residency and investment intention.88
To educate its prospective investors to make informed investment decisions in a
commercial real estate venture, Market Creek Partners transformed its 200-page prospectus into
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Both to direct the benefits of the offering to the local community, as well as to ensure compliance with the
requirements of an exempt intrastate offering.
86
Market Creek Plaza was designed to qualify for the federal intrastate exemption. State residence is thus essential
to qualify for the transaction exemption from Section 5‘s registration requirement for intrastate security offerings.
15 U.S.C.A. §77c(a)(11). Rule 147 further requires the issuer, offerors and purchasers all to be residents of the state
of offer. 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (2008).
87
In addition, certain others with a demonstrated commitment to the Diamond Neighborhoods were also eligible to
purchase DCI units, including owners of businesses within the eight neighborhoods and certain other entities and
individuals. Market Creek Partners, LLC, Offering Circular, at iv (2005).
88
Id. at 39. The offering‘s subscription agreement included ―Sustainability Standards,‖ which required a
prospective investor to make certain declarations regarding her state of residency, to affirm her intent to hold the
securities for investment purposes for a period of no less than nine months, and to acknowledge that the securities
were subject to resale restrictions. Id. at iii.

a 20-page executive summary that included pictures and graphs to answer the investors‘ most
frequently asked questions.

The company‘s business model entailed involving Diamond

Community residents to determine the types of businesses and services the residents hoped
would be developed at Market Creek Plaza.89

Community Benefit. The employment-related local-resident benefits of this joint venture
model are similar to those sought under many CBAs: local hiring and minority contracting. Over
90% of the initial employees at the supermarket were hired from the community. These jobs are
unionized and include living wages, health care, and pension plans. Some 69 percent of the
construction contracts for Market Creek Plaza were awarded to local minority-owned enterprises,
totaling $7.1 million.90

Additional benefits are potentially still more transformative. As a catalyst for civic
participation, the project involved 2,000 adults and over 1,000 youth, who have participated in
land planning, leasing, marketing, research, advocacy, and ownership design. Extensive use of
cross-cultural community teams has been a consistent feature of project implementation.91 In
addition, the project provides for future neighborhood reinvestment, through the residents‘
locally controlled foundation, chartered to grant a portion of the profits from the development
back into the neighborhood.92
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Anne Stuhldreher, The People’s IPO, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (2007), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/the_people_s_ipo_4486; Market Creek Plaza website,
Community Teams, available at http://www.marketcreek.com/mcp_teams_co.html.
90
PolicyLink, Market Creek Plaza: Overview, http://www.policylink.org/Projects/MarketCreek/ (last visited
October 21, 2008).
91
Id.
92
Id.

It is time to activate a stage of cooperative capitalism beyond the familiar examples that
include community development corporations (CDCs), microlending, community development
financial institutions (CDFIs).93

A community enterprise whose shareholders include the

residents when the development project is seeking municipal approvals, and may grow to include
incoming residents, is potentially an economic collaboration in which shareholders enjoy equal
political and economic rights in the entity, more concretely and manageably than in the wider
city polity.

93

Instances of many of these models are described in SHARING THE WEALTH: RESIDENT OWNERSHIP MECHANISMS,
2001,
prepared
by
PolicyLink
in
collaboration
with
FNMA
and
HUD,
available
at
http://www.policylink.org/pdfs/ROMs.pdf. Community-rooted corporations, formed as nonprofits, are importantly
not as nimble nor its capital quite so mobile, due to CDC corporate missions and internal governance procedures. In
this way they may be distinguished from private companies.

IV.

FROM STAKEHOLDERS TO SHAREHOLDERS:
Shares

Community Equity

The fundamental premise of Community Equity Shareholding is that community
members not lose their substantial investments in their place, nor have their residency terminated
by local government land use practices that transfer public resources into largely private
redevelopment of residences for others, unless and until residents have approved the
redevelopment; and unless and until residents receive shares in the economic value of the
project. Such approval might be accompanied by an agreement to exchange their community
residency interests for an equity stake in the benefits generated by the new development. Such an
equity stake could take the form of an alienable right to comparable replacement housing in the
new development, or to shares in the increased economic value justifying the public participation
in the project and generated by it over time, or both.
This set of property interests can be recognized through reforms of the redevelopment
planning requirements of state enabling statutes. The result is a process that invests residents
with rights to consent to development beforehand, and to a share in the benefits of the deal in
which the locality partnered.
Community equity shares make use of a familiar capital vehicle to render visible the
residents‘ stakes in the community. Residents receive shares in the real estate venture – in effect,
becoming members of the joint venture in urban redevelopment.
A. A Responsive Framework
The Community Equity Shares concept offers a responsive framework to the inequitable
allocations inherent in redevelopment theory and practice. It embodies three crucial principles
missing from contemporary PPP practice: the principles of Fair Share – fair and inclusive shares

in the wealth-creation facilitated by public investment; Governance – a right of residents of the
targeted development zone to vote on the character of the planned redevelopment; and Collective
Action – a framework to facilitate the

recognition of the collective social capital of the

community, and intentionality about exchanging it for the development sought by the
public/private partnership.
1.

Fair Shares

Most analyses of the inequitable development problem perpetuates the invisibility of
community stakes, proposing to tweak eminent domain doctrine, but limiting redress to title
owners of affected properties. One straightforward approach is to increase the payments made to
displaced homeowners by monetizing the subjective value of property taken by eminent domain
(―homeowner surplus‖) to deal with the obvious problem that forced sales at fair market value in
severely disinvested neighborhoods fail to compensate displaced long-term owners for ―the
subjective element.‖ While legal determinations of just compensation almost universally reject
paying for the subjective value attributed by the owner, in some circumstances this seems
particularly unjust. Some legal scholars have developed proposals for the award of supplemental
damages to long-term owners according to a legislated schedule reflecting length of tenure; 94 and
programs for self-assessed valuation.95 These analytic developments are important for the subset
of residents in disinvested/development-targeted neighborhoods whom they reach.
Yet the continued exclusion of non-title owners provides no remedy for substantial
numbers of persons, households and their communal interests, which will be destroyed by
94 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 681, 736 (1973).
95 Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 995-1002. Fennell limits her
proposal for such landowner protection to instances of public taking for private transfer where the public use is
unclear. Id. at 995.

redevelopment projects that uproot them.
2.

Governance

The second element is the incorporation of a governance principle, to effect community
consent and control regarding redevelopment decisions in their backyards.96 Recently, Michael
Heller and Roderick Hills proposed to make land assembly the proper subject of the consent of
the residents whose neighborhoods were in need of redevelopment, through Land Assembly
Districts.97 The model of governance they envision is direct control by referendum. Pursuant to
local legislation, the local government would construct consent to the land assembly by declaring
a proposed Land Assembly District, and putting the detailed purchase proposal to a referendum
of the intended condemnees.98
3.

Collective Action

Collective action and community consent could be fostered through voluntary land
assembly, particularly if practiced by communities as a strategy to coordinate with, and benefit
from, market-based redevelopment that threatens to overtake severely deteriorated,
underinvested neighborhoods.99 Such an approach would go a long way to reconnect disinvested
communities to thriving realty markets, by addressing the interrelated problems of land assembly
96 Quinones, supra note_68 at 698 (advocating supermajority resident representation on the board). For a related
discussion of two case studies of ―community-sponsored‖ planning in New York City, see Amy Widman, Replacing
Politics with Democracy: A Proposal for Community Planning in New York City and Beyond, 11 J.L. & POL‘Y 135,
150-73 (2002) (proposing legislative change to equalize the necessary resources and negotiating power among
communities and encourage inclusive processes).
97 Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (2008).
98 Id. at 1490. While this process could be imposed upon the residents who may not have sought this particular
redevelopment, the collective decision-making is similar to that within condominium associations, and labor unions.
Heller & Hills are not entirely clear as to whether they would limit the procedure to landowners, homeowners, or
―neighbors‖; and in the event the LAD were rejected, since the rest of the eminent domain process would still be
available, they structure a procedural opportunity that could be very important to communities that avail themselves
of it, but not an absolute bar to redevelopment. Id. at 1491-1492.
99 James Kelly, We Shall Not Be Moved: Residency as a Property Rule Entitlement, 80 ST JOHNS L REV 923
(2006).

and cost posed to development-seeking cities by fragmented and diversely held titles.
Nonetheless, many communities targeted by PPPs do not have the political organization
or technical support to see the development coming and to act in time. Where communities lack
the leverage to negotiate meaningful promises from developers, their stakes in the urban space
they share should be protected from expropriation.
Separately these principles are important advances for instantiating the equities of longtime residents of the islands of disinvestment in our comeback cities. Yet alone, each is
insufficient to protect community residents‘ interests from destruction by public/private
redevelopment projects.
B. Residents’ Community Capital Stakes Expressed as Limited Property Right
Residents‘ stakes in their community ought to be protected from expropriation by public
agencies when the urban space the community occupies is taken for public/private
redevelopment. Legal security is essential within our system of rights over the control of
resources.100 Protection of residents‘ interests by property rules, rather than the liability rules of
contract or tort, is appropriate to afford residents the necessary sphere of choice not to be
dispossessed and disentitled to the community they have made in their shared location.101
Applying these principles to the contested urban neighborhood, the ―social capital‖ that entwine
viable neighborhoods can be rendered cognizable in these respects by allocating shares in the
100

Bezdek, supra n. 9 at 74-79. A resource or material opportunity may be viewed in more specific legal or fiscal
terms as an ―asset‖ to the degree that it possesses asset-like qualities. Is it generative of more resources? How
readily can it be exchanged or converted into money? Greater liquidity and generative capability confer greater
choice and autonomy on the asset‘s holder. Resources are more like assets to the extent they are durable and foster
reliance: that is, to the extent they are secure in a physical or legal sense.
101 Property rules confer upon the holder of a property right the power to determine whether to transfer the
protected asset and at what price. By contrast, liability rules do not give the holder injunctive relief, but only the
remedy of damages for a nonconsensual transfer, typically at a price set by a third party such as a court or
legislature. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the, Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).

targeted redevelopment enterprise.
This is not a set of interests to be limited by eminent domain doctrine. Eminent domain
rules would be unaffected: for residents in the targeted redevelopment site who own homes or
businesses, ordinary condemnation and compensation principles and procedures would continue
to apply. Community equity shares run to residents. Limiting CESs to natural persons with
established residency would not include absentee owners of rental or commercial properties, nor
to entities.

While the local ordinance would need to establish an appropriate residency

requirement of sufficient length to predate rumors of redevelopment and thus speculative inmoving, there is no conceptual reason to limit proof of residency to leaseholders: each adult in a
household would be entitled to his or her own CES; and so should neighborhood residents who
occupy transitional housing or patronize homeless shelters, or can otherwise demonstrate
sufficient tenure in nontraditional abodes.102
Accordingly, the allocation of Homestead Stakes would recognize the interests of lessees,
commensurate with their common-law entitlement to property. Consider the tenant who has
rented the same apartment for many years, and built up friendships and networks of support
unrelated to the economic value of her year-to-year lease. Land assembly will eliminate the
apartment building and dispossess the tenant of her neighborhood. There is no compelling or
obvious reason why the lessee should not have an equal vote in a decision so fundamentally
affecting her interest.

102

In many urban communities, this group will include individuals who are homeless -- who must sleep in shelters
or on the streets within the targeted area—and street people – those who spend most of their time on the streets
because of inadequate private space or who work in the informal economy on the streets, see MARGARET KAHN,
BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOOD: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE (Routledge 2004); Jeremy Waldron,
Homelessness and Community, 2000 U. TORONTO L. J. 50.

1.

Operational Details: Resident Homestead Stakes & Community Equity Shares

The elements of fair share, governance and collective action can be unified and
reinvigorated in the form of two new interests: the Homestead Stake, and the Community Equity
Share. Shares could be held either in an autonomous Community Equity Company (―CEC‖), or
in the project development entity itself. Direct shareholding reflects community residents‘
steadfastness in their home space.
At the core of the CEC would be the Community Homestead Stake, created by reforms to
existing statutory structures. The Homestead stake, embodying the Governance principle, would
assure that persons who hold legally recognizable interests in their community, should decide
collectively whether the land ought to be assembled into a larger parcel for redevelopment and
put to the proposed uses.
Each resident of the geographic area identified for the redevelopment project would
receive one share in the CEC, the Homestead Stake. The Homestead Stake would give its owner
specific rights to participate in the development decision-making; most importantly, to vote on
the constitutive question of the proposed redevelopment plan. State and local redevelopment
statutes would require the redevelopment agency to submit proposed redevelopment for vote by
the affected Community Homestead Stake holders—effectively conducting a localized
referendum on redevelopment proposals, initiated either by the government agency or the subject
of an application by private developers.

Property law ought to be available to retrofit

community interests into a shared-ownership vehicle.

One rough analogy would be to a

condominium conversion.
The legal right to vote on the question would likely enhance opportunities for the
community to bargain with the public/private development partners for particular community

benefits. Efforts to forge agreements between affected residents and developers or public
development agencies have been undertaken from Seattle to New York in order to mitigate the
harmful effects of aggressive developments and secure specific concessions.103 However, many
communities are unable to muster in time to get to the bargaining table. The Homestead Stake
would correct this inequity. Similarly, such facilitated collective action may promote residents‘
self-protection from speculators in advance of redevelopment activity.
The rules for allocation of Homestead Shares and the operation of the Community Equity
Corporation are designed to ensure that the people most affected by the project‘s need for land
assembly, the residents, have a collective veto over whether the project should proceed upon the
larger parcel that their displacement will allow. The justice of this quid pro quo is especially
apparent where the proffered rationale for the redevelopment is to improve the neighborhood – to
remove ―blight‖ or replace aging infrastructure. The governance rule accompanies the ‗fair
share‘ principal, so that those who will bear the direct costs of the project can decide for
themselves whether they want the proffered improvement.
Allocation of Homestead Stakes should instantiate the interests of lessees as well and
commensurate with their common-law entitlement to property, since leaseholds are property
interests as time-honored as the fee simple absolute. Consider the tenant who has rented the
same apartment for many years, and built up friendships and networks of support unrelated to the
economic value of her year-to-year lease. Land assembly will eliminate the apartment building
103

See Sheila Muto, Residents Have Their Say on LAX Expansion Plans, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2004, at _?__
(discussing the community benefit agreement with the Los Angeles airport which provides for environmental
mitigation, noise reduction, and airport related work; negotiations in Seattle between a public-interest coalition, city
officials, and a company planning the downtown development of a biotechnology hub over affordable housing,
employment, and environmental issues; and the pressure on Columbia University in New York by neighborhood,
business, and civic leaders to ―help create low-income housing in the West Harlem area where [it] has proposed to
expand‖). Community Benefits Campaigns are currently underway in Denver, Miami, Milwaukee, San Diego, San
Jose, and New Haven. See also JULIAN GROSS ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 5 (2005).

and dispossess the tenant of her neighborhood. There is no compelling or obvious reason why
the lessee should not have an equal vote in a decision so fundamentally affecting her interest.104
Recognizing the stakes of tenants addresses the ‗Tyranny of the majority‘ concern of
Federalist 10 that, as one shrinks the size of a jurisdiction, one increases the danger that the
majority will enact rules solely benefiting itself at the expense of a minority for no better reason
than that the majority can. This is exactly the situation when the only players in the land
assembly and use decisions are title holders, many whose connections to the neighborhood are
economic only.
By facilitating the collective action of all the residents, not just real property owners, the
Community Equity Shares provide ballast to the largest landowners in the community, likely to
be institutions such as Real Estate Investment Trusts, corporate landowners, and speculators,
who hold land primarily as an investment.105

In articulating rules of land use law, courts have been skeptical of neighborhood control
over zoning regulations, precisely out of concern to protect the minority against a majority of
104

The same may well be true for transient and homeless people, who while having no abode, nonetheless have
legal residency for voting purposes. See e.g., Coalition for the Homeless v. Jensen, 187 A.D.2d 582 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992) (holding that a state requirement that people live in a traditional dwelling in order to vote placed an
unconstitutional constraint on the voting rights of homeless persons); Fischer v. Stout, 741 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1987)
(ruling that when registering to vote, homeless people may designate a shelter, park, or street corner as their
residence); Collier v. Menzel, 221 CalRptr. 110 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that denying voter registration because
applicants listed a city park as their residence violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
105
An individual owner within the targeted area who would calculate her interests differently and object to
neighborhood decision to approve a deal, would have to choose between the FMV or the compensation forthcoming
as part of that deal. An individual owner who would consent where the neighborhood refused to endorse a proposed
project, would be in no worse position than if developers had never eyed the community. Compared to their
entitlement under eminent domain compensation principles, institutional owners of real property are not
disadvantaged by this allocation of voting rights, by virtue of the likelihood that they derive relatively little producer
or consumer surplus from their holdings in the neighborhood above the land's fair market value. Heller and Hills
argue that a landowner whose subjective value of her parcel is higher, is nonetheless better protected by the
neighborhood control than by the municipality, deeming ―remote‖ the risks that a particular land assembly district
would ignore the interests of any subset of participants. See Heller & Hills, supra note 102, at 1500-1503.

neighbors willing to unite around the goal of restricting a nearby parcel's uses and so enhance the
value of their own land at the expense of the burdened parcel owner.106
The narrowness of the Homestead Stake avoids the doctrinal categories by which courts
have sought to limit the power of neighborhoods to impose new zoning restrictions on parcels for
selfish reasons. Generally, neighbors can approve a variance from preexisting restrictions on a
parcel – but they cannot impose a new restriction.107 By limiting the vote associated with the
homestead stake to the up-or-down question on the project, any bargaining as to the substantive
provisions of the project that provide community benefits – some of which might be viewed as
new use restrictions – remain collateral to the neighbors‘ decision waive extent zoning rules.
This structure simplifies the decision to the narrow question, for or against the use of land
use and assembly powers vis-à-vis a parcel, or not. This segregates the up or down vote from the
several differences in interest and position that might divide a community into antagonistic
factions as to land tenure and other established economic networks, as well as service provision
and potential employment or housing opportunities in the proposed new development.
In comparison, other community-level devices, such as business improvement districts
(BIDs) having broader functions, can more readily create risks of majoritarian exploitation.
BIDs for example provide a range of services from security, street cleaning, parking facilities,
signage, and public relations, to the owners of land within their boundaries. Owners may be
106

See generally Donald J. Kochan, ―Public Use‖ and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an InterestGroup Perspective, 3 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 49 (1998) (describing special interest politics in the context of eminent
domain). See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143-45 (1912) (striking down an ordinance allowing a
two-thirds vote of neighbors to draw a building line because the ordinance ―enables the convenience or purpose of
one set of property owners to control the property right of others‖).
107
Under the nondelegation doctrine, the local legislature cannot delegate its zoning power to the neighbors, because
this power is essentially legislative in character. Id.; see also Asmara Tekle Johnson, Privatizing Eminent Domain:
The Delegation of a Very Public Power to Private, Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 455,
460-67 (2007) (describing the private nondelegation doctrine in the context of eminent domain).

affected in divergent ways that foster contention in the community and difficulty with BID
governance.108
3. The Community Equity Corporation:
Resident Homestead Stakes

A Vehicle for Collective Exercise of

This proposal would also facilitate the residents‘ ability to overcome barriers to collective
action, and thereby avoid selling their neighborhood for an inequitable return.

Local

jurisdictions would recognize rights of residents facing redevelopment displacement, in effect
permitting them to exchange their legitimate interests in the community for shares in the equity
and profit from the redevelopment deal that displaces them. This new right would be created by
statute, authorizing the formation of a CEC, establishing minimum requirements for shares, and
identifying the terms of residence that qualify householders within the area targeted for
redevelopment as Community Equity Shareholders.
Upon formation and assignment of shares, each shareholder would become a member of
the Community Equity Corporation (CEC), a special entity with the power by majority vote to
approve, or to veto, the proposed land assembly if the PPP does not offer an adequate value to
the CEC.
This up or down vote would combine the residents‘ fragmented individual interests into a
whole of sufficient value, economically and politically, that the neighbors have a means to
bargain collectively over the surrender value of the space they occupy collectively. Generations
of experience with PPPs show us what ―bargaining‖ in isolation looks like: to developers, it is
assembly value, but to the residents, it is home, community.109
108

Heller & Hill give the example of merchants who may want to increase the number of parking spaces for
customers, while residential owners might want to cut down on traffic. Heller & Hill, supra note 102, at 1500.
109

Title holders in the area could be permitted to opt out of the CEC and receive their constitutional due.

The CEC would provide a community-controlled vehicle to create and hold residents‘
equity shares in the value generated by the physical and economic redevelopment of their
community, and provide the voting rights that accompany ownership in business entities. The
CEC would reconfigure the ―community interest corporation‖ demonstration program introduced
in the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983 modeled on employee stock ownership
corporations;110 and retooled in the 1992 federal housing legislation to foster ―indigenous
community-based financial institutions.‖111
The Community Equity Shares are conceptually distinct from rights in real property or
condemnation awards that owners of businesses or others in the neighborhood may have. While
this right may be conceptualized as individual in the way that shares in corporations are personal
property, the essential interest it expresses is the joint interest to determination and benefit in the
collectively inhabited geographic space.
The share would give its owner specific rights to participate in the development decisionmaking, and in distributions of profits, just as the other equity owners. Its holders would have the
right, with all others holding similar Community Equity Shares, to participate as members in the
development owner entity as a class of members holding Community Equity Shares in the
increased value generated as equity shareholders. Redevelopment of the site would be contingent
110 Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153, 1172 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (2000)) (creating the
Neighborhood Development Demonstration, requiring the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to
―provid[e] Federal matching funds . . . to [local] organizations on the basis of the monetary support such
organizations have received‖ from neighborhood sources); see also Harold A. McDougall, Affordable Housing for
the 1990’s, 20 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 785-86 (1987).
111 Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 3859 (1992)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5305 (2000)). The aim of the demonstration program was to replicate the success of
community development capital intermediaries such as South Shore Bank in Chicago and the Center for Community
Self Help in Durham, North Carolina, to ―improve access to capital for initiatives which benefit residents and
businesses in targeted geographic areas.‖ Id. § 853(b)(2) at 106 Stat. 3860. ―Community investment corporations‖
were entities organized either as a depository institution of a nonprofit organization affiliated with a non-depository
lending institution or regulated financial institution, whose primary mission was to revitalize a targeted geographic
area, maintain ―accountability to community residents‖ ―through significant representation on its governing board
and otherwise.‖ Id. § 853(b)(3)(D). The board would engage in development services, and have principals ―who
possess[ed] significant experience in lending and . . . development . . . .‖ Id.

upon an exchange of equity shares in the increased values being brought to market.
4. Formation & Operation
To promote transparency of the redevelopment project plan and resulting PPP, it is
necessary to plug the CEC into the city‘s power source: its planning process. Whatever the
initial or ultimate project plan, the development will require some zoning change.
Who initiates the CEC?

Formation of a Community Equity Corporation could be

instigated by existing residents, by a local non-profit organization mobilizing to seek
redevelopment partnerships. Its formation would be triggered when either city planning officials
commence consideration of sites for public/private projects, or a developer proposes plans to the
city and begins to negotiate for assistance with land assembly and related approvals.
How is it initiated? The preliminary application for development approvals would
necessarily identify the boundaries of the intended development site and the lots within it. Every
adult whose residence is within the boundaries would be entitled to notice at this early stage, of
the development proposal, the formation of the CEC, the Homestead Stake and Community
Shares. Because the specific boundaries of the development and affected lots may well change
as the proposal is refined, residents of properties contiguous to the proposed site should be
notified as well.

The statute would provide for facilitated sessions to assure that CEC

resident/members are well-informed about the CEC process, the development proposal, and the
voting and equity rights of shareholding.
These meetings would likely be hosted by the local planning department, but could be
augmented by community-based not-for-profit organizations. More assertive dissemination of
notice such as door-to-door canvassing would be appropriate rather than reliance on postal or
electronic notice to organizations on the planning department‘s radar.

How does a CEC operate? One useful template would be the business improvement
district (BID), of which there are already more than a thousand, authorized in more than forty
states. Formed pursuant to state statute, local ordinance or individual district contracts, a BID is
a model of sublocal governance, a geographic subdivision within a municipality, which provides
district-limited services to supplement those already provided by local government.112 BID
formation statutes generally require that local government and property owners both approve the
district.113 BIDs are usually managed by a public or private BID board that advises, or is advised
by, local government officials.114 By one count, thirteen percent of BIDs are operated by public
agencies, twenty-six percent by mixed public nonprofit partnerships, and sixty-one percent by
not-for-profit organizations.115 BIDs are financed primarily by assessments on local property,
given their highly regulated power to tax the property owners in the district, but otherwise they
have no governmental powers. The CEC enabling statute, like the typical BID statute, would
require the CEC charter to state the boundaries, affect properties, and basic operating and
financing structure of a CEC. CECs will need technical assistance to make informed judgments
about the development proposal on which they will vote, and this essential cost should be
provided for expressly in the enabling legislation. States with affordable housing trust (AHT)
funds, or with local jurisdictions having municipal AHTs, may specify CECs as a categorical
recipient entitled to apply for such funds as well.116
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Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governances, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 365, (1999)
113
See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 36-9-38-8 (West, WESTLAW through 2002 1st Spec. Sess.) (allowing formation
process to begin with approval of owners of twenty percent of affected property).
114
BID enabling statutes generally require that district plans include boundaries, planned expenditures, and other
components of the basic operating and financial structure of a BID. E.g., N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-a (McKinney,
WESTLAW through 2002 legislation).
115
BIDs Fare Well, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 374, 374 n.1 (2003) (citing Mitchell study).
116
ROM study underscores the importance of technical assistance for success.

The enabling legislation would also define the length and character of tenures entitling residents
to Homestead Stakes; and the contents for, or model of, charter documents for the CEC.
This legislation would enable the community residents to engage in collective action,
through a collective voting mechanism, to approve or disapprove the conveyance of their
neighborhood to the city or its development designee seeking to assemble the communityoccupied land. Formation of the CEC at the relevant time in the development deal-making
would equip the community to bargain based on the consolidated value of the many parcels to
the other players in the deal-making. Municipal facilitation of CECs is an appropriate correction
to the civic, social, and economic inequities that public/private development deal-making
practices externalize onto low-wealth communities. The combined interests proposed here, of
Community Equity Corporations facilitated by city government, and Community Equity Shares
in the redevelopment when the community does indeed agree to acquisition, together require the
redevelopment to internalize more of the true social costs it will produce.

V.

CONCLUSION: ADAPTING OWNERSHIP SPREADING TO
COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT PRACTICE

The provenance for the Community Equity Shares concept derives from the policies of
equitable development and social inclusion that undergird federal community development law
since the 1960s. A ―Community Interest Corporation‖ demonstration program was introduced in
the Housing and Urban Rural Recovery Act of 1983; then reconfigured as ―community
investment corporations‖ in federal housing legislation of 1992, with the purpose to replicate
successful community capital initiatives like South Shore Bank in Chicago and Community Self-

Help in Durham, North Carolina. The federal program promoted depository institutions 117 with
the mission to revitalize a geographic area. Each local institution would be statutorily obligated
to maintain ―accountability to community residents‖ through ―significant representation on its
governing board and otherwise.‖
The issuance of equity shares also seeks to address inequities that are the aim of several
models of public contracting. For example, state and local procurement statutes commonly
condition the selection of private developers upon contractual commitments to work with a
designated community representative. Procurement rules make engagement of the targeted
community residents – through a representative at the decision table – a ranked criterion in
requests for proposals, development agreements and regulatory agreements; and incorporated
into the legal documentation of each partnership deal. Such conditions are frequently imposed
ad hoc in many jurisdictions, thus legislating the practice would be the reasonable next step.
Many states allow certain public contracts to be awarded based on ―best value,‖ a concept which
is evolving beyond traditional concerns for low price and responsible bidder to allow public
contracting agencies to consider additional factors,118 including ―negotiated procurement‖ and
―deal local‖ provisions.119

Retooling the legal regime for urban redevelopment for the inclusionary operation of
familiar capital orchestration draws upon predicates in our legal history for transforming
117

Or nonprofit affiliates of nondepository lending institutions or regulated financial institutions.
Dean B. Thomson & Michael J. Kinzer, Best Value in State Construction Contracting, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW.,
Apr. 1999, at 31. States‘ best value procurement rules are variously named ―innovative procurement,‖ ―negotiated
procurement,‖ ―performance-based procurement,‖ and ―competitive negotiation.‖ Id. at 32 (quotations and citations
omitted). In fact, some states specifically exclude cost as a consideration in the initial stage of the procurement‘s
―best value‖ standard. Id.
119
A procurement rule requiring bidders to ―deal local‖ is in some sense analogous to the familiar example of ―Buy
America‖ and ―Buy In-State‖ preferences, which many states have enacted in their design-build procurement laws.
See id. (noting that in some jurisdictions locality of the vendor should be a factor in the best value equation).
118

associational and democratic participation into ownership-spreading equity-like participations.
Examples in real estate contexts include financial institutions with resident ownership
(community development credit unions);120 multiple forms of home-equity cooperative
ventures;121 a long history of agricultural cooperatives122 as well as producer and consumer
cooperatives;123 employee ownership in the forms of Employee Stock Ownership Plans
(―ESOPs‖)124 and worker owned cooperatives;125 public mechanisms to support resident
investment such as IRAs and IDAs;126 and state recognition of the shared-holding aspect of
citizens in an exhaustible natural resource.127
U.S. policy has been extremely successful in ownership-spreading with the important and
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See, e.g., National Federation of Community Development Credit Unions—About Us,
http://www.natfed.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=256 (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (describing the history and
purpose of Community Development Credit Unions).
121 See 42 U.S.C. § 12773(f) (2000) (defining community land trusts); see generally Duncan Kennedy, The Limited
Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85 (2002)
(discussing the limited equity housing co-op as an alternative form of property and comparing it to the leasing
cooperative and community land trust).
122
See Thomas Broden, Note, Co-operatives—A Privileged Restraint of Trade, 23 NOTRE DAME LAW. 110, 114-19
(1947) (describing the history of agricultural cooperatives).
123
See JOSEPH G. KNAPP, THE RISE OF AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE: 1620-1920, at 418-30 (1969)
(discussing the spread of the cooperative from agriculture into other areas, including telephone service, mutual
insurance, and mutual savings banks).
124
In an ESOP, a company sets up a trust fund, into which it contributes new shares of its own stock or cash to buy
existing shares. Alternatively, the ESOP can borrow money to buy. . . shares. National Center for Employee
Ownership, How an Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) Works, http://www.nceo.org/library/esops.html, (last
visited Oct. 16, 2006). The ESOP can make tax deductible contributions to the plan with which to repay the loan.
―Shares in the trust are allocated to individual employee accounts.‖ Id. Plans specify the employee categories that
participate in the plan, and the formula for the allocations. ―In private companies, employees must be able to vote
their allocated shares on major issues, such as closing or relocating [the company],‖ and the company can accord
voting rights on additional issues (including the board of directors). Id. About 10,000 companies now have
employee stock ownership plans, up from 200 in 1974. Crystal Detamore-Rodman, Branching Out: An Employee
Stock Ownership Plan is More than Just a Great Way to Boost Morale, 32 ENTREPRENEUR, Apr. 1, 2004, at 61.
125 See LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER, HOW TO TURN EIGHTY MILLION WORKERS INTO CAPITALISTS ON
BORROWED MONEY 84 (1967); LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER:
EXTENDING THE ESOP REVOLUTION 52 (1986); see also Hockett, supra note_59, at 102-04; Peter Pitegoff, Child
Care Enterprise, Community Development, and Work, 81 GEO. L.J. 1897, 1897 (1993) (proposing the use of ―[c]hild
care enterprise [as] a vehicle for community-based economic development‖).
126 42 U.S.C. § 604(h) (2000) (defining individual development accounts); see also Creola Johnson, Welfare
Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need a Bed and a Car, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1221 (discussing theoretical
framework of individual development accounts and their availability, usage, and success).
127 Alaska‘s Permanent Fund Dividend Program pays each qualified resident of the state an annual dividend from
the Alaska Permanent Fund. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.103-23 (2006). The Fund, created by the state
constitution in 1977, invests one quarter of all revenue the state receives from the sale or rental of its mineral
resources. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15. Since 1982, when the current version of the program was enacted, the
dividends have averaged more than $1000. See Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., The Permanent Fund Dividend,
http://www.apfc.org/alaska/dividendprgrm.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).

enduring success of the federal home finance structure developed through the 1930s and
1940s.128 That innovation has been paralleled in the case of ―human capital‖ spreading through:
public provision of primary and secondary education; the land grant acts of the nineteenth
century by which federal land ―staked‖ the perpetual endowments for state colleges and
universities; the G.I. Bill following World War II that united in one program both loan
guarantees and education as an asset; and direct and indirect loans, grants, and subsidies for
higher education.129
The Community Equity Corporation proposed here is premised on connecting the citizenry
of a geographic place to the economic generative opportunities of that place. It corresponds to
the general stock ownership corporation (―GSOC‖) envisioned by Louis Kelso, the inventor of
the now widely used employee stock ownership plan.130 The Kelsonian GSOC was designed to
be a highly adaptable device to ―ownerize‖ on a regional or community based scale, for example
to create community-wide ownership of local business.131
Community equity shareholding allows residents in the path of public/private redevelopment
the opportunity to enjoy not just benefit, but also ownership in the enterprise. The voting right
attached to the resident share provides a basis for collective bargaining over the character of the
development, and in this way may mirror CBAs‘ utility for community collaborators to wrest
detailed provisions for affordable housing, local hiring, job training, and amenities such as parks

128 Hockett, supra note 59, at 104-17.
129 Id. at 143-53.
130 See JEFF GATES, THE OWNERSHIP SOLUTION: TOWARD A SHARED CAPITALISM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 20 (1998).
131 Id. at 55-58 (1998). Gates suggests that municipalities that use buy-lease arrangements to finance large land
acquisitions could readily restructure such acquisitions as GSOCs to achieve broadly diversified individual
ownership by community residents. Likewise, metropolitan area transit authorities that lease commercial space
associated with their rail stations could restructure these dealings as Community Equity Corporations and achieve
shared ownership by community residents. Id. at 76-77. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2762,
2893 (1978) (adding subchapter U to the Internal Revenue Code); see GATES, supra note 137 , at 76.

and school investments.

Market Creek Plaza‘s community resident investors demonstrate that

residents can successfully co-exist and co-own thriving commercial ventures. The Community
Equity Shareholding proposal suggests a means for localities to meld the two in intentionally
inclusionary and equity-sharing public/private redevelopments, whose neighborhood effects will
induce tremendous changes to the face, and heart, of the community.

